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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant

Appellate Court No 20020328

v.

JUDGE BRUCE K. HALLIDAY

MARIO A. SOTO
Defendant/Appellee,
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The State appealed from the decision of Judge Bruce K. Halliday granting Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss a charge of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, a third degree felony,
enhanced with priors, alleged to be in violation of Utah Code Annotated. Sec. 41-6-44 (Supp.
2001. (R. n
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
Sec 7S-2a-3(2¥e-| Supr,.2QQ2.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. Can the State of Utah charge Defendant with a third degree felony pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. Sec 41 -6-44(6Va) (2001) based on previous violations which occurred on May 20,
1991, March 6, 1993, and July 22, 1995, without violating the provisions of Utah Code Ann.
Sec, 68-3-3. and the ex postfacto and due process provisions of the United States Constitution.
and the Constitution of Utah?
2. Where along the time line does the "ten year'' the amendment of UCA 1-6-44 (6¥aVi>
(2001) begin and end ?
CONSTITUTIONAL. AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Annotated. Sec 41-6-44 (6Va) (1990 to 200n Full text @ Addendum
Utah Code Annotated Sec. 68-3-3.:
No part of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so declared.
United States Constitution. Art. 1. Sec. 10
No state shall... pass any ex postfacto law.
Utah Constitution. Art. 1. Sec. 18:
No bill of attainder, ex post post facto law, or law impairing the obligation
of contract shall be passed.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant stipulates to the Statement of the Case as stated by the State. (AppBrf.P. 2-3)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties stipulated to the facts for the purposes of the motion to dismiss Defendant
stipulates to the State's Statement of the Facts, with the following exceptions:
-2-

1. Defendant disagrees with the State's characterization of the 2001 amendment
to the DUI statute as "within the ten years immediately preceding the
charged offense". When, where and whether the "tm year" amendment applies is
the underlying issue in this case.
2. The violation dates and conviction dates of Defendant's prior DUT offenses are
as follows:
Violation date:

Conviction date:

May 21, 1991

October 8, 1991

March 6, 1993

March 23, 1993

July 22, 1995

March 6, 1996.

(R. 1,32,44-45, 75; R. 97;5-6)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The State argues that the prior two (2) DUI convictions needed to enhance the DUI
charge in this case are prior DUI convictions "within the ten years immediately preceding the
charged offense". (AppBrf P. 4, L. 5)
Defendant argues that the State can use only those violations committed after July 1,
1996, on the grounds and for the reasons that prior to July 1, 1996, the DUI laws provided for
DUI penalties that included only Class B and Class A misdemeanor, The 1996 DUI law was the
first DUI statute in Utah to provide that a DUI is a third degree felony.
Defendant argues that the use of violations and convictions prior 1o July 1,1996, is a
violation of UCA 68-3-3. and the ex post facto and due process prohibitions of the United States
Constitution and the Constitution of Utah.

•3-

ANALYSIS AND ARGUMENT
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE
The State argues that ex post facto principles are not implicated in this case because the
2001 DUI amendment does not apply retroactively, that the statute does not violate
Constitutional ex post facto clauses, and is properly applied to enhance Defendant's charge to a
third degree felony.
The State does not acknowledge that UCA Sec 68-3-3 prohibits retroactive application
of a statute.
Black's Law Dictionary (1951) defines a "retroactive statute" as a
"statute which creates a new obligation on transactions or considerations already past or
destroys or impairs vested rights."
Black's Law Dictionary (195 O defines a "retrospective law" as
(A) law which looks backward or contemplates the past; on which is made to affect acts
or facts occurring or rights occurring before it came into force. Every statute which takes
away or impairs vested rights or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty or attaches
a new disability in respect to transactions or considerations already past. See ex post
facto.
All of Defendant's prior violations and convictions occurred prior to July 1,1996, and
when committed were charged as misdemeanors. The Utah Legislature had not passed a law or
amended a statute providing for a DUI to become a felony. No one, including this Defendant,
knew or could have known that the Legislature would at any time amend the DUI code to
provide for an enhancement to a third degreefelonybased on prior misdemeanor violations and
convictions. Because the law had not yet been amended, Defendant had no notice at the time of
his previous convictions that the prior convictions would, at a later date, become the basis of a
third degree felony charge.
-4-

NOTICE TO DEFENDANT
In 1954, Justice Warren wrote the opinion in the case of United States v. Harris. 347 U.S.
612, and set forth what has become a basic tenant of criminal law.
The constitutional requirement of definitiveness is violated by a criminal
statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that
his conduct is forbidden by statute. The underlying principle is that
no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not
reasonably understand to be proscribed. Id at 617.
In 1964, Justice Brennen quoted the Harris case with favor in the case of Bouie v. City of
Columbia. 347 U.S. 347, as follows:
The basic principle that a criminal statute must give fair warning of the
conduct that makes it a crime has often been recognized by this Court.
Thus we have struck down a state criminal statute under the Due Process
'Clause where it was not sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject
to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to it's penal ties.
We have recognized in such cases that a statute which either forbids or
require the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application,
violates the first essential of due process of of law. Id
In the case at bar, Defendant is one of those defendants who is subject to the law.
All of Defendant's prior violations and convictions occurred prior to the enactment of the
1996 amendments which made a third DUI a third degree felony. In his prior cases, Defendant
had been charged with misdemeanors, and appeared in Court in the Justice Court. No one
advised Defendant at any time during his previous court appearances in the Justice Court that the
misdemeanor DUI violations could and would be used at a later date to enhance his charge to a
third degree felony.
-5-

Justice Warren iaHams/efers to "a person of ordinary intelligence" and the need to give
the "person of ordinary intelligence" "fair notice that his conduct is forbidden by statute".
Defendant in the case at bar could believe that he were to be arrested for another DUI
that he would again go to the Justice Court and be subj ect to the same penalties he had incurred
before. Defendant had no information to the contrary..
The fact that this appeal is in process is clear evidence that the 2001 DUI statute is "so
vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to if s
application."
If trained lawyers have differing opinions regarding their interpretation of the 2001 DUI
statute, can we reasonably expect that a lay person with no legal training could read the DUI
statute of 2001 and determine with any degree of certainty that his prior violations and
convictions could be used as the basis for a third degree felony charge?
The State asserts that Defendant was arrested for the present DUI "approximately ten
weeks after the last amendment" to the 2001 DUI statute. AppBrf P 7 L 6.
The State asserts:
"there was no ex post facto violation because the amendment involved an enhancement
that applied prospectively and served only to punish the offense defendant committed
after the amendment became effective." AppBrf ,P 7
The State, in it's analysis, fails to take into account that without the prior violations and
convictions, the third degree felony charge could not be charged. The enhancement to a third
degree felony depends entirely on the legitimacy of the prior violations and convictions.
The State asserts that "there was no ex post facto violation because the amendment
involved an enhancement that applied prospectively and served only to punish the offense
defendant committed after the amendment became effective." This assertion is invalid on it's
face. Had not the State relied on the the prior violations, there would be no felony charge.
-6-

The State appears to rely on the old adage that "ignorance of the law is no excuse/'
But, in this case, this Defendant is in a particular group of defendants who, because of their
previous violations and convictions, are subject to an enhanced charge.and, therefore, in need of
the knowledge that another DUI violation could be charged as a felony.
Defendant is one of those particular persons who is subject to the law and in need of the
knowledge of what conduct on his part will render him liable to the penalties of the law.
Defendant did not have knowledge of the 2001 DUI law, and even if he had read the statute, he
probably would not have been able to ascertain the meaning of the statute or it's possible
application to him. Trained lawyers prosecuting this case interpret tlie application of the law
from opposite positions.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION OF THE LAW
UCA Sec, 68-3-3 provides: "No part of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless
expressly so declared."
The retroactive provisions of this statute can be avoided if this Court finds that the 2001
amendments to the DUI statute providing for a ten (10) year time frame is simply an extension of
the previous six (6) year time frame which began on July 1,1996.
The 2001 DUI amendments do not contain any language which could be interpreted as
being expressly declared as retroactive.
A review of the DUI laws from 1990 to 2001 is necessary to interpret the meaning of the
2001 DUI law amendment. From 1990 to 1995, all DUI laws were misdemeanors. In 1996, the
DUI. law was amended and for thefirsttime the law provided for a third degree felony charge for
DUI, based on prior DUI violations and convictions, i.e. three prior convictions committed after
April 23, 1990; or two prior convictions for violations committed after July L 1996.
-7-

The language of the DU1 statute of 1996 remained the same in 1997 and 1998, including
convictions are for violations committed after April 3031990? and for violations committed after
July 1, 1996.
In 1999, the language of the statute, UCA 41-6-44(6Xa) changed, and reads as follows:
a third or subsequent conviction for a violation committed within six years
of two or more prior convictions under this section is a third degree felony.

The language of the 2000 DU1 statute is the same as the 1999 statute.

The language of the 2001 DUI statute, at issue here, was changed again, as follows:
(6)(a) A conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) is a third degree felony
if it is committed
(i) within 10 years of two or more previous convictions under this section.,
(ii) at any time after a conviction of
(A) automobile homicide...
(B) a felony violation under this section committed after July 1,2001.
Of particular note is the fact that neither the 1999 DUI statute, the 2000 DUI statute, or
the 2001 DUI has any language regarding "convictions for violations committed" after a certain
date. The previous language from the 1996 statute referred to convictions for violations
committed after April 23, 1990 or July 1, 1996.
The 2001 DUI statute at issue here does not contain language refeiring to convictions for
violations of the DUI statute after a certain date. The logical solution is to look back at the
previous statutes and determine the status of the law at the time of the last reference to
"convictions for violations committed" after a certain date.

-8-

The 1996, 1997, and 1998 DUI statutes are identical, and include:
(ii) three prior convictions are for violations committed after April 23, 1990, or
two prior convictions are for violations committed after July 1,1996.
Of note is the fact that at no time during this litigation has the State or the Defendant
attempted to use the April 23, 1990, date as a factor. Obviously, that date would be subject to
the ex post facto and due process prohibitions as outlined in this brief, and specifically for the
reason that all DUI violations and convictions were for misdemeanors, and none of the
convictions for DUI during the time period prior to July L 1996 could have been used to enhance
the charge in this case to a felony level.
The change to a third degree felony came on July 1, 1996, and the 19% DUI amendments
specifically provided for the "two prior convictions are for violations after July 1, 1996".
The fact that the 1999, 2000, and 2001 DUI statutes do not include the "two prior
convictions ..for violations after July 1, 1996' does not mean that any violation at any time can
now be used to enhance the charge to a third degree felony. The July 1, 1996 was set in the Code
in July of 1996, and wall remain in the Code until amended. The violation date and conviction
date are both crucial elements of the DUI statute for the purposes of determining under which
law a defendant will be prosecuted, and whether the statue of limitations is still in play or has
expired.
The most recent amendment to the DUI Code pertaining to the date of the violation and
the conviction is July 1, 1996, the same date that the DUI statute was amended to a third degree
felony. The legislature provided that the statute would be prospective because the charge of a
third degree felony could only be brought for violations and convictions after July 1, 1996.
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All of the DUI statutes from 1990 to 2000 refer to either the violation or the conviction
being within "six years", and identify the time period within which a defendant will be subject to
the statute.
The 2001 DUI amendment changed the time period from six years to ten years.
The State argues as follows;
However, the class B misdemeanor was subject to enhancement to a third degree
felony when the accused had two or more prior DUI convictions within the ten years
immediately preceding the charged offense. AppBrf P. 4
The State is in error. AH of the DUI laws reviewed here refer to certain and specific dates
at which time the statute becomes effective, a time period within which violations and/or
convictions can be considered, and a time period within which the charge may be brought before
the statute of limitations expires. Only in the ease of the expiration of the statute of limitations
does the date of the criminal deed become the relevant factor. No statute makes a crime a crime
by referencing backwards to the last violation for the same crime as the time frame for
determining the present charge.
The fact that the 2001 DUI law does not refer to the July 1, 1996 date as the date after
which violations occurred within the six year period, does not erase the July 1, 1996 date. The
legislature may have been attempting, by the noticeable absence of the July 1„ 1996, date after
which violations and convictions can be charged to mean that the State can now resurrect old DUI
violations and convictions prior to 1996 -will not work. To do so would be to allow all old DUI
violations and convictions to be resurrected retroactively for years prior to 1996, a result that is
not plausible in view of the ex post facto prohibitions.
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The 2001 DU1 statute amended the six year time frame to a ten year time frame. The
2002 statute does not read "the last ten years'*, and cannot apply to the last 10 years without
violating the ex post facto prohibitions.
The 2001 DUI statute amended the six year provision and replaced it with a ten year
provision. The ten year provision then operates in the same manner as the six year provision.
The six year provision came into law in the 1996 DUI statute, on July 1, 1996, at the same time
the law was changed to allow DUI enhancement to a third felony, based on prior violations and
convictions.
The ten year change in the 2003 DUI law replaces the six year provision previously
enacted. The July 1, 1996 statute provided for a third degree felony based on two or more prior
violations and convictions within six years and is still good law even with the ten year
amendment.
But, where does the new ten year amendment fit?
Defendant argues that the ten year amendment fits into the statute exactly where the six
year amendment began, i.e. on July 1, 19%, and continuing prospectively for the next ten years.
Defendant argues that by this construction of the DUI statutes from 1990 to 2001, the
statute is Constitutionally sound and not in violation of the provisions of UCA Sec. 68-3-3
EX POST FACTO APPLICATION
Defendant argues that the use of prior violations and convictions which occurred prior to
July 1, 1996, on the grounds and for the reasons that prior to July 1,1996, all prior violations
and convictions were misdemeanors. No.one could foresee or knew or could have known that on
July 1,1996, that a third DUI could be charged, not only as a misdemeanor, but as a third degree
felony. The application of prior DUI convictions prior to July 1,1996, are ex post facto.
-11-

Black's Law Dictionary (4th Edition, 1957) (P 662.) defines ex postfacto:
A law passed after the occurrence of a fact or commission of an act, which
retrospectively changes the legal consequences, or relations of such fact or deed.
In the case of Weaver v. Graham. 450 U.S. 24, the United States Supreme Court held:
For a criminal or penal law to be ex postfacto, it must be retrospective, that it
must apply to events occurring before its enactment, and it must disadvantage
the offender affected by it.

All prior violations of this Defendant occurred prior to July 1, 1996, the date the
amendments to the DUI law changed the offense from a misdemeanor to a third degree felony.
Prior to that time, the penalties for DUI were limited to misdemeanors.
The 1996 DUI law required two prior DUI violations to enhance the charge to a third
degree felony and specifically for violations and convictions committed after July 1, 1996.
The 1996 increased the charge against a defendant from a misdemeanor to a third degree felony.
If the prior DUI convictions of this defendant, all of which occurred prior to the change in
the 1996 DUI law, are used as enhancements to increase the charge, that application would be an
ex postfacto violation. The prior DUI convictions were "events occurring before its enactment",
i.e. prior to the enactment of the 1996 DUI law. .
The 1996 DUI law,using prior misdemeanor convictions, if allowed to be applied to this
Defendant, would definitely be a disadvantage, in that it could subject him to a third degree
felony charge, based on prior misdemeanor violations and convictions..

-12-

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
The State dismisses the case of State v. Lusk. as not relevant to the application of a
statute of limitations which had been amended subsequent to commission of the crime being
prosecuted. (2001 UT 102 at 25-26).
The State quotes the position universally held by appellate courts that a
statutory amendment enlarging a statue of limitations will extend the limitations period
applicable to a crime already committed only if the amendment becomes effective before
the previously applicable of limitations has run, thereby barring prosecution of the crime.
The four year limitation period in Lusk was amended to provide for a longer period, and
the amendment could not resurrect the State's ability to prosecute Lusk for the crime."
The State contends that because Defendant was arrested for the present offense after the
2001 DUI became law that the State can prosecute him for a third degree felony under the 2001
DUI law.
The State fails to take into account that without the prior violations and convictions, all
of which were committed prior to the enactment of the 2001 law, the State would not have the
enhancements necessary to elevate this offense to a third degree felony. It is the prior violations
and convictions that are the essence of this charge. It is the prior violations, committed prior to
the enactment of the 2001 DUI law, that are the violations on which the statute of limitations has
run. The 2001 DUI law did not and cannot resurrect those prior violations and convictions.

The trial court analyzed and addressed this issue as follows:
The Court concludes that as to this particular defendant the enhancement limitation
period of the prior statute had expired before the effective date of the the new legislation
and no enlargement of the limitation period as to this defendant is allowable. Therefore,
the prosecution is precluded from pursuing a third degree felony under the facts of this
case. Trial Court Ruling P. 3
'13-

CONCLUSION
Defendant respectfully requests that this Court uphold the Order of the trial court, enter
a judgment in favor of Defendant, and order that the case against Defendant be dismissed.

Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that on this
day of yxHViA g»>^i
•> 2003,1 caused
to be mailed two true and correct copies of the above arid foregoingterief of Appellee, postage
prepaid, and addressed as follows:
KRIS C. LEONARD
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South 6th Floor
PO. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411-4-0854
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ADDENDUM
DUI STATUTES FROM 1990

TO 2001

UCA 41-6-44 (1990)
(6)(a) A third or subsequent conviction within six years under this section ...is a
(i) class B misdemeanor if one or both of the prior convictions is for an
offense committed prior to April 23,1990; and
(ii) class A misdemeanor if both of the prior convictions are for offenses
committed after April 23,1990.
UCA 41-6-44 (1991)
(6) (a) A third or subsequent conviction within six years of two prior violations
under this section... is a:
(i) class B misdemeanor except as provided in Subsections (6) (a) (ii)
and (7); and
(ii) class A misdemeanor if both of the prior convictions are for violations
committed after April 23, 1990.
UCA 41-6-44 (1992)
(6) (a) A third conviction for a violation committed within six years of two prior
violations under this section...is a:
(i) class B misdemeanor except as provided in Subsections (6) (a) (ii)
and (7); and
(ii) class A misdemeanor if both of the prior convictions are for violations
committed after April 23,1990.
UCA 41-6-44 (1993)
(6) (a) A third conviction for a violation committed within six years of two prior
violations under this section is a:
(i) class B misdemeanor except as provided in Subsections (ii) and (7);
and
(ii) class A misdemeanor if both of the prior convictions are for violations
committed after April 23, 1990.

i

UC A 41-6-44 (1994)
(6) (a) A third conviction for a violation committed within six years of two prior
violations under this section is a:
(i) class B misdemeanor except as provided in Subsections (ii) and (7);
and
(ii) class A misdemeanor if both of the prior convictions are for violations
committed after April 23,1990.
UCA 41-6-44 (1995)
(6) (a) A third conviction for a violation committed within six years of two prior
violations under this section is a:
(i) class B misdemeanor except as provided in Subsections (ii) and (7);
and
(ii) class A misdemeanor if both of the prior convictions are for violations
committed after April 23, 1990.
UCA 41-6-44 (1996)
(6) (a) A third or subsequent conviction for a violation committed within six
years of two or more prior convictions under this section is a:
(i) class B misdemeanor except as provided in Subsection (ii); and
(ii) third degree felony if at least:
(A) three prior convictions are for violations committed after April
23, 1990; or
(B) two prior convictions are for violations committed after July 1,
1996.
UCA 41-6-44 (1997)
(6) (a) A third or subsequent conviction for a violation committed within six
years of two or more prior convictions under this section is a:
(i) class B misdemeanor except as provided in Subsection (6) (a) (ii);
and
(ii) third degree felony if at least:
(A) three prior convictions are for violations committed after April
23,1990; or
(B) two prior convictions are for violations committed after July 1,
1996.

ii

3 UCA 41-6-44 (1998)
(6) (a) A third or subsequent conviction for a violation committed within six
years of two or more prior convictions under this section is a:
(i) class B misdemeanor except as provided in Subsection (6) (a) (ii);
and
(ii) third degree felony if at least:
(A) three prior convictions are for violations committed after April
23,1990; or
(B) two prior convictions are for violations committed after July 1,
1996.
UCA 41-6-44 (1999)
(6) (a) A third or subsequent conviction for a violation committed within six
years of two or more prior convictions under this section is a third degree
felony.
UCA 41-6-44 (2000)
(6) (a) A third or subsequent conviction for a violation committed within six
years of two or more prior convictions under this section is a third degree
felony.
UCA 41-6-44 (2001)
(6) (a) A conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) is a third degree felony if it is
committed:
(i) within 10 years of two or more prior convictions under this section; or
(ii) at any time after a conviction of:
(A) automobile homicide under
(B) a felony violation under this section that is committed after July
1,2001.

in

